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In Canadian law, the question of whether agents for federal and provincial 
governments can be liable to consumers in negligence has traditionally 
been resolved in the negative. However, when many Canadians suddenly 
fell ill and others died due to exposure to listeria-infected meat products in 
mid-2008, the ensuing public health crisis and criticism of the government 
agency that handled it obliged the Prime Minister to call for an 
investigation and report upon the conduct of the Canadian Food Inspection 
Agency. In the context of the unfolding investigation, the authors examine 
the underlying rationale and policy reasons for the Canadian courts’ 
doctrine of Crown immunity and whether the time might be ripe for policy 
change in circumstances like those which gave rise to the losses caused by 
listeriosis. 
I INTRODUCTION 
In the summer of 2008, 57 Canadians were confirmed with listeriosis, and 22 
of those infected ultimately died, in each case from eating processed meat 
from a Canadian food supplier. This caused public concern across the nation. 
Before this outbreak, there had been no widespread concern among ordinary 
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citizens as to whether food products they purchased were accurately labelled, 
nor whether, prior to purchase, the government had properly verified food 
safety for consumption, nor how the food inspection agency would protect 
consumers from the risk of illness or death in the event of contamination.  
While no food inspection system is perfect, the public expects incidents 
involving contaminated food to be rare in urban centres. This expectation 
arises, firstly, from public trust in government to actively regulate the 
conditions surrounding the sale and distribution of foods and beverages for 
public consumption and, secondly, from the assumption that suppliers have an 
interest in maintaining consumer confidence in their products. Both 
government and suppliers have incentives to maintain public confidence in 
food production by ensuring the reasonable safety of the consumption of food 
products. When confidence in either government or suppliers is shaken, the 
political and economic responses can be serious and swift.  
Economic fallout for a supplier following a food contamination or safety 
incident can be severe because of a rapid loss of consumer confidence in a 
product – and a corresponding drop in product sales. The heaviest economic 
consequences also include the need to settle or defend lawsuits which now 
include class actions. Political fallout for a government can be manifested by 
loss of voter confidence resulting in punishment at the next election. 
However, the question of whether governments and their agents may also be 
liable to victims is not well understood.  
The severe aftermath of a listeriosis outbreak in Canada in 2008 has now 
raised the question of whether government or the applicable government 
agency can be made liable in a court of law if the regulatory regime and its 
enforcement were found to be inadequate, if inspection agents were found to 
have failed in their statutory duties, or if it were determined that the proper 
functioning of the food safety system was stymied because of a lack of 
organisation and protocols on the part of the government or its responsible 
agents.  
In Canada in recent years plaintiffs have not had much success in claims 
against governments where negligence is alleged on the basis of the failure of 
government to enforce regulations or comply with its statutory duties.1 
However, the listeriosis outbreak and another Canadian incident involving 
contaminated milk2
                                                 
1 Lewis Klar, ‘Syl Apps Secure Treatment Centre v. B.D.: Looking for Proximity within 
Statutory Provisions’ (2007) 86(2) Canadian Bar Review 337, 339.  
 have now raised questions about the competence of the 
2 See Doug Schmidt, ‘Milk Lawsuit: Windsor man says his family became ill after drinking 
milk; company says metal in milk wasn’t hazardous’, The Windsor Star, 17 October 2008. 
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Canadian Food Inspection Agency (the ‘CFIA’). Both incidents have given 
rise to class actions, neither of which named the CFIA as a defendant, despite 
allegations from the lead plaintiff in the latter case that the CFIA was 
‘lackadaisical’ in its response to his complaints.3
This paper will examine the circumstances surrounding the listeriosis crisis in 
Canada in light of the prevailing Canadian judicial authority with a view to 
determining whether a cause of action might lie against the CFIA for breach 
of public duty, whether there might be any basis upon which the CFIA could 
be held liable to the victims of listeriosis, and the policy reasons, if any, for so 
finding.  
  
II THE INCIDENT – MAPLE LEAF, LISTERIOSIS AND THE 
 CFIA 
A What is Listeriosis? 
According to the website of the CFIA, listeriosis is caused by contamination 
from Listeria monocytogenes (commonly called Listeria):  
Listeria monocytogenes (commonly called Listeria) is a type of bacterium 
often found in food and elsewhere in nature. … Unlike most bacteria, 
Listeria can survive and sometimes grow on foods being stored in the 
refrigerator. Moreover, foods that are contaminated with this bacterium 
look, smell and taste normal. Listeria can be killed by proper cooking 
procedures. 
Listeria is more likely to cause death than other bacteria that cause food 
poisoning. In fact, 20 to 30 percent of foodborne listeriosis infections in 
high-risk individuals may be fatal. However, it should be noted that 
listeriosis is a relatively rare disease in Canada … 
Symptoms may start suddenly and include: 
• Vomiting;  
• Nausea;  
• Cramps;  
• Diarrhea;  
                                                 
3 Ibid.  
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• Severe Headache;  
• Constipation; or  
• Persistent fever.  
In some instances, these symptoms may be followed by 
meningitis encephalitis (an infection of the brain or its 
surrounding tissues) and/or septicemia (blood poisoning), 
either of which can result in death.4
B The 2008 Listeriosis Outbreak in Canada 
 
As of April 2009, the 2008 outbreak of listeriosis in Canada connected to 
meat from a Maple Leaf Foods Inc food packing plant had resulted in 57 
confirmed cases of listeriosis and had been determined to be the contributing 
cause of death in 22 cases.5 The CFIA had launched an investigation into the 
listeriosis outbreak but did not issue a notice to the public for a further three 
weeks, which media reports charged was too long.6
(i) examine the events, circumstances and factors that contributed to the 
listeriosis outbreak; 
 The same news reports 
also criticised the CFIA for issuing a notice with respect to only two products 
three days after finding evidence linking a ‘Maple Leaf’ meat plant with the 
listeriosis outbreak, and for delaying the issuance of a broader recall for a 
further two days after that. Given the criticism from the media over the 
handling of the outbreak and the rising concern of the Canadian public, Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper announced on 3 September 2008 that an 
investigation into the crisis would occur. On 6 September 2008 he announced 
the terms of reference for that investigation as follows: 
(ii) review the efficiency and effectiveness of the response of the federal 
organizations, in conjunction with their food safety system partners, in 
terms of prevention, recall of contaminated products and collaboration and 
communication with its food safety system partners and consumers;  
                                                 
4 Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Food Safety Facts on Listeria (2008) 
<http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/fssa/concen/cause/listeriae.shtml > at 14 October 2009. 
5 Public Health Agency of Canada, Listeria monocytogenes outbreak (2009) <http://www.phac-
aspc.gc.ca/alert-alerte/listeria/listeria_2009-eng.php> at 14 October 2009. 
6 See David McKie, ‘Review points to holes in CFIA food safety system’, CBC News, 24 
September 2008, <http://www.cbc.ca/consumer/story/2008/09/23/f-cfia.html> at 14 October 
2009. 
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(iii) make recommendations, based on lessons learned from this event and 
from other countries in terms of best practices, as to what could be done to 
enhance both prevention of a similar outbreak occurrence in the future, and 
removal of contaminated product from the food supply; 
(iv) perform his/her duties without expressing any conclusion or 
recommendation regarding the civil or criminal liability of any person or 
organization; 
(v) adopt procedures for the expedient and proper conduct of the 
investigation, including reviewing relevant records and documents and 
consulting as appropriate; and 
(vi) submit to the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food, in both official 
languages, before 15 March 2009, a report on the matters listed in (i) to (iv) 
above.7
C The Evidence against the CFIA in Respect of the 
 Listeriosis Outbreak 
 
In September of 2008, news reporters from the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation (‘CBC’) and the Toronto Star newspaper obtained, through a 
request pursuant to Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy 
legislation, an internal government document prepared in 2005 entitled The 
CFIA Food Emergency Response Review (the ‘2005 CFIA review’). In a 24 
September 2008 news report the news reporters solicited and then summarised 
views on the contents of the 2005 CFIA review from informed commentators 
as follows: 
The CFIA’s corporate planning, reporting and accountability branch 
examined three areas that, at the time, were deemed to ‘require immediate 
attention’: 
1) The need to clarify and communicate the responsibility for recall 
 decisions. 
2) The need to improve the risk/assessment process.  
3) The need to improve follow up activities.8
                                                 
7 Office of the Prime Minister, Media Release, Stephen Harper, Prime Minister announces 
terms of reference for an independent investigation of the listeriosis outbreak(2008) Prime 
Minister of Canada (September 6, 2008) <http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp? 
category=1&id=2268> at 14 October 2009.  
  
8 McKie, above n 6. 
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The news reporters noted that the 2005 CFIA review also drew the following 
conclusions: 
a) ‘…There is no clear policy on when a recall requires public 
warning.’  
b) ‘Within the CFIA there is no common understanding of what is 
meant by recall followup, more specifically for longer term 
followup.’  
c) ‘…processes and strategies do not appear to be in place for 
systematically  dealing with repeat [recall] offenders.’ 
d) ‘Concerns had been raised that that too much reliance is being 
placed on information provided by the establishment, or in the 
case of imports, the foreign country.’  
e) ‘[I]nspection staff [in some areas] may not be receiving sufficient 
hands-on experience in inspection activities and interview 
techniques.’  
f) ‘[Problems in the inspections and warning processes] [result] 
from confusion regarding who has the lead. It causes delays in 
obtaining required information, questions are raised about the 
laboratories concerning the appropriateness of taking additional 
samples and/or different advice [is] given to the area field staff on 
the need to expand the investigation to other projects or firms.’  
g) The way the CFIA conducts risk assessments is time consuming 
and at times inefficient.  
h) ‘Information on recalls could be shared more widely.’ In some 
countries (for example, the US and Australia) information on all 
recalls is publicly available.9
The news reporters stated that the Federal Government had been aware of the 
problems at the CFIA for years and that many of the concerns highlighted in 
the 2005 CFIA review had been made in two previous internal reviews in 
1997 when the CFIA was first established. Moreover, they reported that in 
2000 Canada’s Auditor General expressed similar concerns. CBC reported 
that the 2005 CFIA review also called for enhancement of the quality of food 
safety inspection. Although the 2005 CFIA review stated that ‘[m]ost findings 
 
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
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in this report have previously been identified by the various parties involved 
in food recalls’,10 the news reporters noted that, in the aftermath of the 
outbreak public health, officials and politicians reassured Canadians that 
‘Canada has one of the best food safety systems in the world’.11
The news reporters further reported that, prior to 1 April 2008, CFIA 
inspectors conducted actual tours of plants but, after that date, the CFIA 
implemented a compliance verification system which allowed corporations to 
conduct their own inspections and report the results to the CFIA. The CFIA 
inspectors would then simply review the corporation’s paperwork. The news 
reporters stated that critics alleged that the new system resulted in fewer 
inspections. That allegation appeared confirmed in the spending estimates of 
the Canadian government released before the listeriois outbreak, which 
indicated a decrease in food inspection spending by 12 per cent over three 
years as well as a decrease of 5 per cent for staffing.
  
12
The Globe and Mail, one of Canada’s national newspapers, reported on 27 
September 2008 that the Canadian Auditor-General in 1999 had criticised the 
CFIA for not fully cooperating with provincial authorities about an outbreak 
of salmonella poisoning that had left 800 people ill.
  
13
D The Legislated Mandate of the CFIA 
 This report cited an 
examination of the role of the CFIA in regulating agricultural biotechnology 
by an expert panel of the Royal Society of Canada in 2001. This examination 
concluded that ‘a significant conflict of interest’ arose from the CFIA being 
charged with both protecting public health and promoting trade in 
biotechnology.  
The CFIA was established in 1997 by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency 
Act, SC 1997, C-16.5 (the ‘Act’). The CFIA’s mandate is set out in the 
preamble which states as follows: 
 
 
                                                 
10 Robert Cribb, ‘Food alarms rang in '05’, Toronto Star/CBC, 24 September 2008  
< http://www.healthzone.ca/health/article/504671# > at 22 October 2009. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Karen Howlett and Caroline Alphonso, ‘Agency waited 5 days to issue meat recall’, The 
Globe and Mail, 27 September 2008, A8. 
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Preamble 
WHEREAS the Government of Canada wishes to enhance the effectiveness 
and efficiency of federal inspection and related services for food and animal 
and plant health by consolidating them; 
WHEREAS the consolidation of those services under a single food 
inspection agency will contribute to consumer protection and facilitate a 
more uniform and consistent approach to safety and quality standards and 
risk-based inspection systems; 
WHEREAS the Government of Canada wishes to have that food inspection 
agency deliver those services in a cost-effective manner; 
WHEREAS the Government of Canada wishes to promote trade and 
commerce; 
AND WHEREAS the Government of Canada wishes to pursue a greater 
degree of collaboration and consultation between federal departments and 
with other orders of government in this area … 
The principal responsibilities of the CFIA are set out in section 11 as follows: 
(1) The Agency is responsible for the administration and enforcement of the 
Agriculture and Agri-Food Administrative Monetary Penalties Act, Canada 
Agricultural Products Act, Feeds Act, Fertilizers Act, Fish Inspection Act, 
Health of Animals Act, Meat Inspection Act, Plant Breeders’ Rights Act, 
Plant Protection Act and Seeds Act. 
(2) The Agency is responsible for the enforcement of the Consumer 
Packaging and Labelling Act as it relates to food, as that term is defined in 
section 2 of the Food and Drugs Act. 
(3) The Agency is responsible for 
 (a) the enforcement of the Food and Drugs Act as it relates to food, as 
 defined in section 2 of that Act; and 
 (b) the administration of the provisions of the Food and Drugs Act as 
 they relate to food, as defined in section 2 of that Act, except those 
 provisions that relate to public health, safety or nutrition. 
(4) The Minister of Health is responsible for establishing policies and 
standards relating to the safety and nutritional quality of food sold in 
Canada and assessing the effectiveness of the Agency’s activities related to 
food safety. 
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(5) The Canada Border Services Agency is responsible for the enforcement 
of the program legislation referred to in paragraph (b) of the definition 
“program legislation” in section 2 of the Canada Border Services Agency 
Act as that program legislation relates to the delivery of passenger and 
initial import inspection services performed at airports and other Canadian 
border points other than import service centres.  
 
The powers of the CFIA are set out in section 14 as follows:  
(1) The Agency may enter into contracts, memoranda of understanding and 
other agreements with a department or agency of the Government of 
Canada or the government of a province and with any other person or 
organization in the name of Her Majesty in right of Canada or in its own 
name. 
(2) In exercising its responsibilities, the Agency may negotiate and enter 
into arrangements for the implementation of technical requirements for the 
international movement of products or other things regulated under an Act 
or provision that the Agency enforces or administers by virtue of section 11. 
Action may be taken against the CFIA in respect of any obligation incurred by 
it:  
15. Actions, suits or other legal proceedings in respect of any right or 
obligation acquired or incurred by the Agency, whether in its own name or 
in the name of Her Majesty in right of Canada, may be brought or taken by 
or against the Agency in the name of the Agency in any court that would 
have jurisdiction if the Agency were not an agent of Her Majesty. 
The CFIA may issue recall orders: 
19. (1) Where the Minister believes on reasonable grounds that a product 
regulated under an Act or provision that the Agency enforces or administers 
by virtue of section 11 poses a risk to public, animal or plant health, the 
Minister may, by notice served on any person selling, marketing or 
distributing the product, order that the product be recalled or sent to a place 
designated by the Minister. 
2) Any person who contravenes a recall order referred to in subsection (1) is 
guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not 
exceeding $50,000 or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months 
or to both. 
(3) For greater certainty, a recall order is not a statutory instrument for the 
purposes of the Statutory Instruments Act, but no person shall be convicted 
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of an offence under subsection (2) unless the person was notified of the 
order. 
The CFIA may enter into agreements with provincial governments to carry 
out activities within its responsibilities: 
20. The Minister may, with the approval of the Governor in Council given 
on the recommendation of the Minister of Finance, enter into an agreement 
with one or more provincial governments for the provision of services or the 
carrying out of activities within the responsibilities of the Agency, in 
common with those governments. 
In its short lifespan, the Act has not been the subject of any significant judicial 
consideration and, until the listeriosis outbreak, was not the subject of 
significant media attention. 
III CANADIAN LAW AS TO GOVERNMENT LIABILITY FOR 
 NEGLIGENCE  
In Canada, the determination of whether a government will be liable in 
negligence consists of a two step legal test which was first articulated in the 
House of Lords decision in Anns v Merton London Borough Council14 
(‘Anns’). Despite the later rejection of this decision in 1991 by the House of 
Lords in Murphy v Brentwood District Council,15
The facts in Anns were that a Borough Council had approved plans for the 
creation of a two-storey block of apartments. The plans called for the 
foundations to be three feet or deeper according to the approval of local 
authority. In fact, the constructed foundations in the apartments were only two 
feet and six inches deep. A few years later, cracks appeared in the walls of the 
flats and the floors had begun to slope. The plaintiffs claimed damages against 
the Borough due to the negligence of the council surveyor in approving 
foundations that were inadequate. 
 Canadian courts have 
retained the test set out in Anns to determine whether a negligence claim 
against government can proceed or ultimately succeed.  
In Anns, the builder was under a statutory duty to notify the local authority 
before covering up the foundations and the local authority had, at that stage, 
the right to inspect and to insist on any correction necessary to bring the work 
into conformity with the by-laws. In his reasons for decision on behalf of the 
                                                 
14 [1978] AC 728. 
15 [1991] 1 AC 398.   
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majority of the House, Lord Wilberforce noted that the local authority had 
statutory powers and duties that were owed generally to the public rather than 
private individuals, and that public duties were not subject to liability.16 In the 
United States, this principle is generally expressed by the statement that ‘a 
duty to all equals a duty to none’.17
However, Lord Wilberforce then considered whether there could be some 
circumstances in which the law could find that a private law duty was owed to 
individuals that would enable a suit against a government actor in negligence. 
Lord Wilberforce said that the first step is to analyse the powers and duties of 
the authority to determine whether they require the authority to make ‘policy’ 
decisions or ‘operational’ decisions. He said: 
  
Most, indeed probably all, statutes relating to public authorities or public 
bodies, contain in them a large area of policy. The courts call this 
‘discretion’ meaning that the decision is one for the authority or body to 
make, and not for the courts. Many statutes also prescribe or at least 
presuppose the practical execution of policy decisions: a convenient 
description of this is to say that in addition to the area of policy or 
discretion, there is an operational area. Although this distinction between 
the policy area and the operational area is convenient, and illuminating, it is 
probably a distinction of degree; many ‘operational’ powers or duties have 
in them some element of ‘discretion.’ It can safely be said that the more 
‘operational’ a power or duty may be, the easier it is to superimpose upon it 
a common law duty of care.18
Lord Wilberforce considered the argument that, where the local authority is 
under no duty but merely has a power to inspect, it can avoid liability for 
negligent inspection by simply deciding not to inspect at all. He pointed out 
that such argument overlooks the fact that local authorities are public bodies 
operating under statute with a clear responsibility for public health in their 
area. They must, therefore, make their discretionary decisions responsibly and 
for reasons that accord with the statutory purpose. They must at the very least 
give due consideration to the question of whether they should inspect or not 
and, having decided to inspect, they must then be under a duty to exercise 
reasonable care in conducting that inspection. 
 
Lord Wilberforce rejected the notion that a distinction was to be made in this 
context between statutory duties and statutory powers, such that the former, 
but not the latter, would give rise to potential liability. His reason was that  
such a distinction would ignore the fact that there may co-exist with public 
                                                 
16 Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728, 754. 
17 South v Maryland 9 US (18 How) 396 (1855).  
18 Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728, 754. 
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law duties owed by local authorities parallel private law duties to avoid 
causing damage to other persons in proximity to them.19 He referred to the 
trilogy of House of Lords cases – Donoghue v Stevenson,20 Hedley Byrne & 
Co v Heller & Partners Ltd,21 and Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co,22
(1) is there a sufficiently close relationship between the parties (the local 
authority and the person who has suffered the damage) so that, in the 
reasonable contemplation of the authority, carelessness on its part might 
cause damage to that person? If so, 
 – and 
noted that those authorities clearly established that in order to decide whether 
or not a private law duty of care existed, two questions must be asked: 
(2) are there any considerations which ought to negative or limit  
 (a) the scope of the duty? 23
Lord Wilberforce concluded that, if a duty were to be found, it was then to be 
determined to whom the duty is owed or who is within the class of persons to 
whom it is owed and what damages might result from a breach of such a duty. 




Lord Wilberforce ultimately found that the defendant in Anns was under a 
private law duty to the plaintiff. This being the case, it had to exercise a bona 
fide discretion as to whether to inspect the foundations or not and, if it decided 
to inspect them, to exercise reasonable skill and care in doing so. He 
concluded that the allegations of negligence were consistent with the Council 
or its inspector having acted outside any delegated discretion either as to the 
making of an inspection or as to the manner in which the inspection was 
made. 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada adopted the Anns analysis in Kamloops (City) v 
Nielsen,25 and then reformulated the test in Just v British Columbia.26 It then 
elaborated upon the test in Cooper v Hobart (‘Cooper’).27
                                                 
19 Ibid 756. 
  
20 [1932] AC 562. 
21 [1964] AC 465. 
22 [1970] AC 1004. 
23 Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728, 751-2. 
24 Ibid 752. 
25 [1984] 2 SCR 2. 
26 [1989] 2 SCR 1228. 
27 [2001] 3 SCR 537. 
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In Cooper, the plaintiff was one of a large number of investors who had used 
the services of the defendant, a registered mortgage broker who had 
misappropriated funds belonging to the plaintiff. The plaintiff argued that, by 
a certain date, the Registrar of Mortgage Brokers was aware of the 
defendant’s serious violations of the governing legislation and should have 
acted more promptly in suspending its licence. The plaintiff sued the Registrar 
for the losses suffered by the investors which, he argued, could have been 
avoided or diminished had the licence been suspended. The Supreme Court of 
Canada stated that the issue on the appeal was whether the Registrar of 
Mortgage Brokers, a statutory regulator, owed a private law duty of care to 
members of the investing public for alleged negligence in failing to properly 
oversee the conduct of an investment company licensed by the regulator. It 
held that the Registrar did not owe a duty of care to the investors.  
The Court summarised the applicable test:  
In brief compass, we suggest that at this stage in the evolution of the law, 
both in Canada and abroad, the Anns analysis is best understood as follows. 
At the first stage of the Anns test, two questions arise: (1) was the harm that 
occurred the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s act? 
and (2) are there reasons, notwithstanding the proximity between the parties 
established in the first part of this test, that tort liability should not be 
recognized here? The proximity analysis involved at the first stage of the 
Anns test focuses on factors arising from the relationship between the 
plaintiff and the defendant. These factors include questions of policy, in the 
broad sense of that word. If foreseeability and proximity are established at 
the first stage, a prima facie duty of care arises. At the second stage of the 
Anns test, the question still remains whether there are residual policy 
considerations outside the relationship of the parties that may negative the 
imposition of a duty of care. It may be, as the Privy Council suggests in 
Yuen Kun Yeu, that such considerations will not often prevail. However, we 
think it useful expressly to ask, before imposing a new duty of care, whether 
despite foreseeability and proximity of relationship, there are other policy 
reasons why the duty should not be imposed.28
The Supreme Court of Canada also made two important observations with 
respect to the second stage of the Anns analysis. It held that the need to 
proceed to the second stage generally arose only where the duty of care 
asserted did not fall within a previously recognised or analogous category of 
recovery. The exception to this general rule would be a case that involves the 
distinction between policy and operational decisions, regardless of whether 
they fall into established categories.  
 
                                                 
28 Ibid 30. 
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In Cooper, the Supreme Court of Canada held that if the factors giving rise to 
proximity existed, they must be found in the statute under which the Registrar 
was appointed, as that statute was the only source of his duties. The Court 
went on to conclude that the enabling statute did not impose a duty of care on 
the Registrar with respect to those individuals who invested with the mortgage 
brokers regulated by the statute. The Supreme Court found that the Registrar’s 
duty was to the public as a whole and, indeed, that a duty to individual 
investors would potentially conflict with the Registrar’s overarching duty to 
the public.  
The Supreme Court also articulated other policy reasons for rejecting the 
argument that a duty existed, namely that it would effectively be requiring the 
Registrar to be an insurer for the losses of the investors. Therefore, the spectre 
of unlimited liability to an unlimited class loomed large as an additional 
policy reason for denying liability.  
A compelling criticism of the Court’s reasoning has been made by Lewis 
Klar, a torts professor at the University of Alberta.29
Since Cooper, Canadian courts of appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada 
have had the opportunity to apply the Cooper analysis to cases where the 
government is named as a defendant due to alleged failures to protect the 
public or certain members of the public from harm resulting from a regulated 
activity or product. In some cases, the actions against government were 
dismissed summarily. However where other actions have proceeded through 
to trial, few have ultimately succeeded, as the following review will illustrate.  
 Professor Klar contends 
that the flaw in the approach in both Anns and Cooper was in searching for 
proximity within statutory provisions. This stance was inconsistent with the 
way Canadian negligence law approaches the issue of statutory breach, and 
fruitless in any event. His theory is that proximity derives from relationships 
which require a consideration of the interactions between the parties. He notes 
that while statutes might perhaps offer a rationale for the existence of a 
relationship between the parties, statutory duties would always, by their 
nature, reflect public duties owed at large. Professor Klar argues that such a 
focus would nearly always result in the finding that no private duty or 
proximity existed. He insists that an analysis of the actual circumstances and 
relationship between the parties using the common law principles of 
negligence would provide a superior analytical framework.  
In the case of Drady v Canada (Minister of Health),30
                                                 
29 Klar, above n 1. 
 the plaintiff was the 
recipient of a silastic device used in temporomandibular joints (‘TMJ 
30 (2008) 300 DLR (4th) 433 (Ontario Court of Appeal). 
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implant’). He alleged that the TMJ implant was unsafe because he had been 
left disabled and in pain. He was unable to identify the manufacturer of the 
implant because it was unlabelled, so he sued Her Majesty the Queen in Right 
of Canada (‘Health Canada’) in a proposed class proceeding, seeking to 
represent all Canadians, other than those in British Columbia and Quebec, 
who had suffered damage from TMJ implants. He asserted that Health Canada 
had breached a private law duty of care it owed to him and other recipients 
and had failed to properly regulate the TMJ implant industry, thereby failing 
to ensure the safety and regulatory compliance of the TMJ implant. He further 
alleged that Health Canada personnel knew of the danger posed by the TMJ 
implant, but failed to warn the public or prohibit the distribution or use of the 
same. The claims focused on the relationship of Health Canada with Vitek 
Inc, a manufacturer of the TMJ implant. Health Canada failed to obtain from 
Vitek a Notice of Compliance prior to the sale and use of their TMJ implant in 
Canada. Drady made no claim against any of the third parties joined to the 
action by Health Canada.  
Health Canada brought a motion to dismiss Drady’s action. The motions 
judge concluded that Drady’s failure to name the manufacturer of his TMJ 
implant was fatal to his claim, as there was no causal connection between 
Drady, the TMJ implant and its manufacturer, and Drady’s pleadings 
otherwise disclosed no cause of action in negligence against Health Canada 
for not establishing regulations or not regulating in a particular manner.31
Two months later, the same motions judge dismissed an application by Health 
Canada to strike the pleadings of Taylor, another TMJ implant recipient. In 
Taylor v Canada (Health),
  
32
In 1988, Taylor, the representative plaintiff, received a Vitek implant, and 
claimed that it had subsequently deteriorated, causing her significant injuries. 
She alleged that Health Canada had failed to exercise its powers pursuant to 
the Food and Drugs Act and had been, or ought to have been, aware that the 
TMJ implant was prone to mechanical deterioration and disintegration when 
used, which caused severe and potentially catastrophic reactions. Taylor 
further alleged that Health Canada knew that no Notice of Compliance had 
been issued to Vitek, that it was aware that Vitek was distributing the TMJ 
 the facts were that Health Canada had required, 
in 1983, a Notice of Compliance for certain medical devices sold in Canada. 
An American corporation, Vitek Inc, had been manufacturing and selling TMJ 
implants since 1968 and had informed Health Canada in May 1983 of its 
intention to export such TMJ implants to Canada, but it had never obtained a 
Notice of Compliance. 
                                                 
31 (2007) 159 ACWS (3d) 177 (Ontario Superior Court of Justice). 
32 (2007) 285 DLR (4th) 296 (Ontario Supreme Court of Justice). 
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implant without a Notice of Compliance, that, after a request for a Notice of 
Compliance had been rejected, Health Canada had initially taken no steps to 
intervene, and that Health Canada had taken no action when its written 
requests for compliance were ignored. Taylor also alleged that Health Canada 
had erroneously recorded in its database that a Notice of Compliance had been 
issued and, when it discovered its error, had taken no steps to notify medical 
professionals of the same. She also alleged that, at this same time, Health 
Canada had received reports from health authorities in the United States that 
the TMJ implants were generally unsafe.  
Justice Cullity of the Ontario Superior Court certified Taylor’s class action, 
holding that it was incumbent upon Health Canada to enforce the requirement 
by ensuring that all devices met the necessary statutory standards. While his 
findings related only to certification of the class action and not the merits, he 
held that, where Health Canada takes steps to implement the policies in the 
Food and Drugs Act in a purported exercise of its statutory powers, it is acting 
operationally and could be liable for the manner in which it executes or 
carries out the policy. He noted that, from 1983 to 1994, Health Canada had 
failed to enforce its own policy regarding Notices of Compliance and thereby 
established the requisite proximity with the private individuals who received 
the implants.  
Justice Cullity did not accept the argument of Health Canada that a finding in 
Taylor’s favour could expose government to a torrent of litigation. Instead, he 
found that, in the unique circumstances of the case, the question of proximity 
and broader policy considerations should be left to the trial judge, and, given 
the particular facts, the spectre of unlimited liability, interference with the 
policy decisions of government and massive litigation seemed fanciful.  
Justice Cullity explained that a result different from that in Drady had 
occurred because Taylor had raised the issue of negligent operational 
decisions on the part of Health Canada. Its alleged negligence lay in its having 
encouraged importers of TMJ implants to believe that they could ignore 
regulatory requirements for the devices with impunity. This allegation could 
reasonably support a finding that the acts or omissions of Health Canada 
increased the risk to the health of Taylor and other implant recipients.  
In Drady, the plaintiff’s appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal was dismissed 
on the basis that it was plain and obvious that Drady’s pleadings failed to 
establish that Health Canada owed him a private law duty of care. The 
legislative scheme in place when Drady received his implant did not involve a 
relationship between Health Canada and the consumer of medical devices. 
Health Canada had mechanisms to enforce compliance with labelling and 
other regulatory requirements, but enforcement was entirely discretionary, 
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rather than mandatory. The Ontario Court of Appeal further noted that any 
breach of the public law duty of care of Health Canada to other Canadian 
residents generally did not give rise to a private law cause of action. Health 
Canada had made no specific representations to Drady with respect to the 
safety of the implants. Finally, there was no allegation in Drady’s case that 
Health Canada, in failing to follow its own policies, had increased the risk of 
harm to Drady. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was 
refused.33
In Holtslag v Alberta,
 
34 in which leave to appeal was refused, the claim 
concerned pine shingles for the roofs of houses which were not chemically 
treated with a preservative to inhibit fungal growth.35
Attis v Canada (Health),
 As a result, the pine 
shingles turned black within four to five years after installation on roofs, and 
were extensively decayed within five to eight years after installation. 
Although the roofs to which they had been applied did not leak, the shingles 
disintegrated. A class action was commenced against the Government of 
Alberta for the cost of replacing the roofs and/or damages for loss in value of 
the plaintiffs’ homes. The plaintiffs alleged that the provincial Director of 
Building Standards had breached a duty of care owed to them in issuing 
product listings authorising the use in Alberta of untreated pine shingles as a 
roof-covering material. The Government of Alberta successfully applied for a 
non-suit before the case management judge. An appeal from that decision to 
the Alberta Court of Appeal was dismissed on several grounds. First, the case 
involved a posited duty of care which, if found, would be novel. Second, there 
were no categories of proximate relationship analogous to the relationship 
between the Director and the appellants. When the judge applied the required 
legal analysis to determine whether a duty of care should be imposed, it was 
clear that there was no sufficiently proximate relationship between the parties 
and nothing in the statute to ground a duty of care. Moreover, the Director’s 
decisions to issue product listings were policy decisions to which liability did 
not attach, and recognising a duty of care in this situation would give rise to 
unlimited liability to an unlimited class.   
36
                                                 
33 (2008) 300 DLR (4th) 443. 
 was a class action brought by claimants who had 
silicone breast implants which leaked or ruptured, resulting in alleged 
catastrophic medical consequences and permanent disabilities. Such implants 
were listed and regulated as medical devices under the Food and Drugs Act 
and regulations. The claim alleged that the respondent, Health Canada, was 
liable in negligence for breaching its duty to properly regulate the said 
34 (2006) 265 DLR (4th) 518. 
35 (2006) 265 DLR (4th) 518. 
36 (2008) 300 DLR (4th) 415. 
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medical devices. On application for a non-suit, the motions judge concluded 
that, plainly and obviously, the claim disclosed no cause of action because the 
underlying legislative and regulatory scheme did not support the appellants’ 
argument that the respondent owed them a private law duty of care. 
On appeal from the dismissal of the motion for certification of the proposed 
class proceeding in Attis, the Ontario Court of Appeal denied the appeal on 
the basis that Health Canada acted within its mandate in exercising its 
discretion regarding the enforcement of its regulatory regime. It had no 
interaction with the appellants in the course of that role. The Court of Appeal 
agreed with the motions judge that it was plain and obvious that the appellants 
failed to allege facts capable of establishing the necessary proximate 
relationship. Further, the Court of Appeal found that the imposition of the 
duty of care was negated under the second stage of the Anns test by residual 
policy considerations reflecting the broad societal and legal implications of 
imposing a duty of care. These included the spectre of indeterminate liability 
which could result in the government becoming a virtual insurer of medical 
devices and the chilling effect of the imposition of a duty of care in the public 
health context.  
At paragraphs 66 and 67 of its decision, the Ontario Court of Appeal 
articulated the sort of interaction that would create the necessary proximate 
relationship:  
However, once the government has direct communication or interaction 
with the individual in the operation or implementation of a policy, a duty of 
care may arise, particularly where the safety of the individual is at risk. If, 
for example, a government decides to issue a warning about a specific 
danger, in this case medical devices, or to make representations about the 
safety of a product, the government may be liable for the manner in which it 
issues that warning, or the content of those representations, especially where 
the government disseminates the warning or representation knowing that the 
individual consumer will rely on its contents and the individual does so.  
For example, Goudge JA found that a proximate relationship was pleaded in 
Sauer on the basis of specific public representations made by Canada that it 
was acting to protect the interests of the commercial cattle farmers. The 
Supreme Court in Finney also found a duty of care where a clearly 
identifiable complainant directly interacted with the Barreau in the context 
of its professional complaints process. Accordingly, a duty of care can be 
assumed and evidenced by the interaction between the parties, depending on 
the closeness of the relationship. 
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The Supreme Court of Canada had an opportunity to reconsider the Anns test 
and Crown liability in Holland v Saskatchewan.37
The farmers then sued the Saskatchewan government, claiming damages, in 
part, for negligence. A motions judge denied the government’s application to 
strike but, on appeal, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal agreed that the claim 
should be struck on the footing that no action for negligence could stand 
against the Crown for negligently acting outside its jurisdiction. On further 
appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in part, ruling that 
the negligence claim against the government for failure to implement the 
judicial decree could stand because it was an ‘operational’ decision rather 
than a ‘policy decision’ that the government was obliged to carry out. 
However, it declined to recognise a new category of negligent breach of 
statutory duty, finding that it agreed with the reasoning of the Saskatchewan 
Court of Appeal that such recognition would raise the spectre of indeterminate 
liability and result in a chilling effect on government discretion. 
 There the plaintiffs, a group 
of farmers, had not registered in a federal program aimed at preventing 
chronic wasting disease in domestic cervids (elk, deer and reindeer), due to 
objections to the broad indemnification and release clauses in the registration 
form. Because of the failure to register, the farmers’ herd status had been 
downgraded. As a result, their ability to sell and the price they could receive 
for the animals had diminished. Their application for judicial review of the 
decision to include the indemnification and release clauses succeeded, but, 
despite the successful ruling, the government took no steps to either reinstate 
the farmers’ herd status or compensate them for lost revenue.  
Based on the foregoing review, absent additional and specific representations 
or actions by government that bring a plaintiff into a closely proximate 
relationship with government, Canadian courts will not impose liability for 
negligence on governments or their regulatory agencies in cases of harm 
resulting from the use of defective products. This is so even when such 
agencies have regulatory responsibilities involving supervisory oversight. 
Accordingly, Canadian consumers of food products might well ask what legal 
requirements would be necessary to impose an actionable duty of care upon 
federal or provincial regulatory agencies. 
In Northern Goose Processors Ltd v Canadian Food Inspection Agency,38
                                                 
37 (2008) 294 DLR (4th) 193. 
 the 
plaintiff had asked the CFIA for information about why its name had been 
removed from a certain export list and what it had to do to reverse the 
removal. The correct response to those inquiries involved the provision of 
information pertaining to certain European Union decisions and requirements. 
38 (2006) 206 Man R (2d) 276. 
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However, the inspectors at the CFIA gave the plaintiff conflicting and 
incorrect information. As a result, the plaintiff sustained considerable 
economic losses from entering business obligations under the mistaken belief 
that it could continue to export to the European Union. It then sued the CFIA 
to recover damages for the losses. In this instance, the Court imposed liability 
on the CFIA because there had been sufficient interaction between the CFIA 
and Northern Goose that the plaintiff was entitled to rely on the 
representations made by the CFIA’s inspectors and because the CFIA had 
continually failed to provide the requisite information to it.  
In Adams v Borrel, four plaintiffs were involved in the farming and marketing 
of seed potatoes in New Brunswick.39
The trial judge dismissed the action on the ground that all the impugned 
actions of AgCan qualified as operational decisions and therefore it was 
immune from any liability for damages flowing from any prima facie duty of 
care that might exist. In the alternative, the trial judge held that none of the 
impugned conduct of AgCan qualified as negligence.  
 They and many other such farmers 
suffered economic loss as a result of a potato virus that originated with seed 
potatoes grown in and marketed from the province of Prince Edward Island. 
The plaintiffs, for themselves and in a representative capacity, sued 
Agriculture Canada (‘AgCan’), for economic loss suffered, alleging that it had 
negligently mishandled the potato virus problem in respect of the 1990, 1991 
and 1992 crop years. 
In Adams, the New Brunswick Court of Appeal allowed the plaintiff’s appeal 
in part, by finding that once the decision to investigate had been made, AgCan 
owed the appellants a prima facie duty of care to conduct a timely 
investigation with respect to identifying the source of the virus. Further, the 
Court found that that duty was not negated either by overriding policy 
considerations, such as the prospect of an unlimited liability to an unlimited 
class, or by the application of the policy/operational dichotomy. Citing the 
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Ingles v Tutkaluk Construction 
Ltd,40
In deciding whether the municipality owed the homeowner a duty of care, 
the Court distinguished between policy and operational decisions at page 
311: 
 Robertson JA, writing for the Court, found that ‘negligent inspections’ 
were an established circumstance in which courts had found government 
authorities to be liable. He stated:  
                                                 
39 (2008) 297 DLR (4th) 400. 
40 (2000) 1 SCR 298. 
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Inspection schemes fall within the second type of legislation identified 
by Lord Wilberforce. To determine whether an inspection scheme by a 
local authority will be subject to a private law duty of care, the court 
must determine whether the scheme represents a policy decision on the 
part of the authority, or whether it represents the implementation of a 
policy decision, at the operational level. True policy decisions are 
exempt from civil liability to ensure that governments are not restricted 
in making decisions based upon political or economic factors. It is 
clear, however, that once a government agency makes a policy decision 
to inspect, in certain circumstances, it owes a duty of care to all who 
may be injured by the negligent implementation of that policy; see, for 
example, Just v British Columbia, [1989] 2 SCR 1228, at p 1243, per 
Cory J; Rothfield v Manolakos, supra, [1989] 2 SCR 1259, at p 1266, 
per La Forest J. 
[Emphasis that of Robertson JA] 
It is the last sentence of the above quote that is of precedential significance 
to this case. That sentence states that once the government agency makes a 
policy decision to inspect, a duty of care will arise unless the circumstances 
dictate otherwise. The parallel between the present case and Ingles is self-
evident. Both involve a government actor deciding to carry out an 
investigation. 
There are other reasons why I am convinced the present case falls within an 
existing or analogous category of case in which a duty of care has been 
recognized. A key determinant in that inquiry is the nature of the statutory 
scheme under which the government actor is performing and, in particular, 
the identity of those whom the scheme is meant to protect. If one turns to 
the legislative framework from which AgCan derives its mandate, notably s. 
2 of the Plant Protection Act, AgCan’s statutory obligation is clear: ‘... to 
protect plant life and the agricultural ... [sector] of the Canadian economy 
by preventing ... the spread of pests’ through the adoption of either control 
or eradication measures. 
One cannot escape the reality that an immediate purpose of the legislative 
scheme is to protect the agricultural sector of the economy by protecting the 
interests of farmers. In these circumstances, it would be disingenuous to 
hold that no prima facie duty of care was owed to this group of 
entrepreneurs. In this case, AgCan exercised its statutory authority and 
mandate to detect ‘pests’, in the form of plant disease in crops, and took 
steps toward control or eventual eradication. AgCan specifically decided to 
conduct an investigation in order to address a potential risk of harm, in the 
same way a municipality might decide to implement a scheme of road 
maintenance or building inspection for the purpose of minimizing personal 
harm or damage to property and the resulting economic loss. One might go 
further and equate the role of plant inspectors appointed under the federal 
legislation with building or road inspectors appointed under municipal 
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legislation. In both cases, an inspector who performs his or her obligations 
in a negligent manner would normally be held liable for his or her 
misfeasance. For these reasons, I am prepared to hold that the present case 
falls within an existing or analogous category of cases in which a duty of 
care has been previously recognized. It follows that AgCan owed the 
appellant farmers a prima facie duty of care to carry out its investigation 
with respect to the identity and source of the pathogen affecting the tobacco 
crop in the Port Bruce area of southwestern Ontario. That duty was owed to 
both tobacco and potato farmers alike.41




The finding by Robertson JA in Adams that negligently conducting an 
investigation was an established duty of care category has potential 
ramifications for plaintiffs who may suffer harm similar to that caused in the 
listeriosis outbreak and who may contemplate action against the CFIA. 
Recently, the CFIA has been sued in connection with two different incidents 




However, Robertson JA also opined in Adams (in obiter at paragraph 74) that 
the Supreme Court of Canada had made ‘recent efforts to limit the ambit of 
government liability’. This was reflected in the Holland decision. So it would 
appear that the issue of what circumstances will give rise to Crown liability 
may remain unresolved in Canadian jurisprudence for some time. 
 In the second of these suits, the Los Angeles Salad Co 
case, an application to strike the negligence action was unsuccessful. 
Arguably, these cases suggest that a transition may be under way in the 
judicial consideration of this issue. 
It is appropriate now to examine whether the foregoing developments suggest 
that the Canadian courts may now reconsider whether there are policy reasons 
to hold the CFIA liable to the victims of listeriosis or similar food 
contamination cases. 
                                                 
41 (2008) 297 DLR (4th) 400, [41]-[44]. 
42 See [2009] SCCA No 470 (Unreported, Supreme Court of Canada, McLachlin CJ, Abella 
and Rothstein JJ), 23 April 2009). 
43 See Cheticamp Packers (1991) Ltd v Canada (Canadian Food Inspection Agency) (2005) 
238 NSR (2d) 84 and Los Angeles Salad Co v Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2009 BCSC 
109. 
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IV CFIA LIABILITY IN CONNECTION WITH LISTERIOSIS 
The news reports mentioned above suggest that the CFIA launched an 
investigation into the listeriosis outbreak at the beginning of August 2008. 
The CFIA determined about two weeks later that the probable cause was 
contamination at the Maple Leaf Foods Inc meat plant. The CFIA then 
conducted further tests and waited for absolute certainty before issuing a 
public notice and requesting the recall of potentially affected Maple Leaf 
products.  
There is no question that the tortfeasor legally responsible for the listeriosis 
outbreak in Canada was Maple Leaf Foods Inc, the owner and operator of the 
meat plant where the bacteria were discovered to have contaminated the meat 
products. Further, there is no question that the courts will provide legal 
recourse against entities directly responsible for food contamination causing 
personal injuries and economic losses. Indeed, a class action launched against 
Maple Leaf Foods Inc on behalf of the victims of the listeriosis outbreak has 
already been settled. That action did not name the CFIA for the reason that, in 
the experience of those plaintiff lawyers, class action suits against the federal 
government have been, typically, painfully long and expensive, and the 
federal government does not have the same motivation to settle as do private 
corporations.44
As noted from the foregoing review, there are valid and important policy 
reasons for limiting the ambit of government liability. First, the courts ought 
not to usurp the roles of the federal or provincial legislatures. Second, 
government policy decisions often involve a balancing of economic, social, 
moral and political considerations. Third, public duties owed to the citizenry 
at large are not intended to found private actions and remedies; otherwise 
there would be unlimited liability on the part of governments to an unlimited 
group of citizens. Finally, it is not the role of government to stand as an 
insurer for the risks and liabilities incurred or caused by others.  
  
Further, the reasoning of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal in Adams could 
create a foundation for a reasonable cause of action for damages for 
negligence against the CFIA. While in Adams the most likely and foreseeable 
damages were economic, in the case of food safety it is evident that, given the 
nature of the potential harm demonstrated by the listeriosis outbreak, it is now 
foreseeable that negligent inspections can have potentially fatal consequences.  
                                                 
44 Shauna N Finlay, Interview with Mr Robinson, Counsel for the Plaintiffs Merchant Law 
Group LLP (Saskatchewan, 5 January 2009). 
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V RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Two recent developments since the initial presentation of this paper may 
provide opportunities for review and revision of the current legal regime for 
determining Crown liability and the responsibilities of the CFIA.  
First, the independent investigation into the listeriosis outbreak ordered by the 
Prime Minister concluded in July of 2009, with the publication of the Report 
of the Independent Investigator into the 2008 Listeriosis Outbreak (the 
‘Report’).45 The Report found that critical failures in the CFIA contributed to 
the listeriosis crisis. In particular, the Report noted the CFIA’s 
implementation of a new system of inspection, called the Compliance 
Verification System (‘CVS’), was not properly implemented and resulted in 
inspectors not being adequately trained in how to deal with their new 
inspection duties. The Report observed that the CVS requires critical 
improvements to its design if is to be effective in protecting consumers.46
The second development has been the launch of an appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Canada in an action against the CFIA where both lower courts 
concluded that the CFIA owed no duty to the plaintiff.
 The 
Report also found that among federal and provincial bodies that are 
responsible for public health, there was insufficient knowledge about even 
existing policies and protocols dealing with foodborne illness outbreaks and 
public health emergencies. Overall, the Report concluded that the CFIA failed 
to properly respond to the risks presented to the public by consuming 
processed meat products containing listeria. The Report called for significant, 
although not legislative, re-evaluation of the operations of the CFIA and of 
other public bodies.   
47
                                                 
45 Report of the Independent Investigator into the 2008 Listeriosis Outbreak (2009) 
 The appeal will 
afford an opportunity to revisit the traditional analysis of Crown liability in 
light of the reasoning of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal in Adams and 
the scholarly commentary offered by Professor Klar. Each of these 
developments could allow for consideration of a modification of the current 
   <http://www.listeriosis-listeriose.investigation-enquete.gc.ca/index_e.php?s1=rpt&page=tab> 
at 9 November 2009. 
46 Ibid 88, note 45.  
47 The case of River Valley Poultry Farm Ltd v Attorney General of Canada, (2009) 95 OR (3d) 
1 (CA) is a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal wherein the Court dismissed a claim 
against the CFIA for negligent investigation of a potential salmonella infection of the eggs of 
a chicken egg producer. The plaintiff claimed that, due to the length of time taken to complete 
the investigation, he was forced to destroy an entire flock of chickens instead of a more 
limited number. The lower court and the Court of Appeal both concluded that the CFIA owed 
no duty to the plaintiff and therefore there could be no liability for the conduct of the 
investigation.   
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trend to restrict Crown immunity where actions of government agents 
carrying out inspection and regulatory duties amount to ordinary or gross 
negligence.  
VI CONCLUSION 
The listeriosis outbreak in 2008 dramatically illustrated to Canadians the risks 
of inadequately inspected food and the importance of swift and accurate 
public notification and product recall procedures. As a result of the crisis, 
more Canadians are likely to be questioning whether, given the high risk of 
harm, there is a valid reason for providing legal immunity to agencies such as 
the CFIA. At this time it is unclear whether reaction to the recent Report will 
result in a public demand for legislative changes that would increase the level 
of the Crown’s legal responsibility to ensure the safety of foods sold to 
consumers. However, the Report has called for significant re-evaluation of the 
operations of the CFIA and of other public bodies. The Report may provide 
the impetus for a judicial consideration of whether increased legal 
responsibility on the part of the Crown is now necessary for Canadians. If the 
Canadian courts do not provide the requisite relief, legal reform will then only 
come about if Canadians appeal to their Members of Parliament to introduce 
an acceptable legislative solution. 
